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Abstract 
Although the WTO embraces over 90% of world trade, several large CIS 
transition countries have not joined it yet. Delays have not only been due to 
technical problems, but also to a lack of clear understanding of the consequences 
of WTO membership. The aim of this paper is to ask how important improved 
market access might be as an incentive for one of the biggest CIS countries, 
Ukraine, to join the WTO. 
We employ the gravity model of international trade and include data on 85 of 
Ukraine’s trade partners. By looking at initial conditions for Ukrainian exports, we 
estimate the extent to which Ukrainian exports are hurt by barriers imposed by its 
trading partners, as well as Ukraine’s potential level of trade. 
Our estimates show that import barriers imposed by Ukraine’s trade partners do 
not play an important role in determining the volume of Ukrainian exports. 
Moreover, Ukraine already exports twice the potential level, predicted by our 
gravity model. Nevertheless, Ukraine depends on small number of unprocessed 
and semi-processed export goods and the efficiency of its exporting industries is 
quite low. 
These results suggest that the Most Favoured Nation mechanism and putative 
improved market access might not be an important criteria for deciding Ukraine’s 
accession to the WTO.  Our results are consistent with other studies on transition 
economies, which found that WTO membership plays a much less important role 
in improving market access than do increasing FDI, regularising dispute 
settlements, and improving resource allocation. 
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1. Introduction 
A high priority of Ukrainian international economic policy is to join the WTO. 
However, this process has been ongoing for a decade already, and is likely to 
continue for several more years
1
.  This slow progress has been due not only to 
technical problems, but also to a lack of clear understanding of what consequences 
WTO membership might entail. 
Of course, as any trade policy change, membership in the WTO has its costs and 
benefits. The main costs are expected to be a short-term decrease of output due to 
stronger foreign competition, lower fiscal revenues as a result of reduced import 
tariffs, and restricted sovereignty over trade-related policies. The benefits are 
believed to include improved access to major export markets via the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) mechanism, access to dispute settlements, invigoration of 
domestic economic reforms, and an increase of foreign direct investment (Drabek 
and Laird, 1977). In this paper we concentrate on one of these issues only: 
improved access to foreign markets2. 
The conventional view of many Ukrainian economists and policy-makers is that 
by becoming a member of the WTO, Ukraine will enjoy significant benefits from 
improved access of domestic exporting enterprises to foreign markets. However, 
such statements are not backed by any in-depth economic analyses in most cases, 
and cannot be accepted as self-evident. In fact, several researchers have shown 
that membership in the WTO does not automatically bring improved foreign 
market access and increased exports. Moreover, specific features of the Ukrainian 
economy cast doubt on the prospective increase of exports. Please note that in 
Ukraine the volume of foreign trade is already extraordinarily high: exports are 
over 60% of GDP, compared with around 35% in Germany, 30% in Poland or 
even 45% in oil-exporting Russia. Also, Ukraine still relies on a small number of 
traditional exports, mostly low- and semi-processed products and in many cases 
Ukraine still follows the traditional patterns of trade, inherited from the USSR. 
Since it is not evident to what extent the WTO will help Ukrainian exporters to 
capture a larger foreign market share, we saw an urgent need for an additional 
study of this issue. 
In this study we try to throw some light on this problem by asking two questions: 
1) To what extent do barriers imposed by foreign trade partners hurt 
Ukrainian exports at this moment and 2) What is the potential level of 
                                           
1
 The process of Ukraine’s accession to the WTO system started in 1993, when the official 
application was submitted. Since that time 9 Working Party meetings have been held 
and 10 bilateral agreements with members of the WTO were signed. Although 
Ukrainian officials claim that it will be possible to become a part of the WTO by 
2003, the process will most likely continue for a longer period.     
2
 We should note that sometimes access to export markets is understood to include access 
to the MFN mechanism as well as to dispute settlement. In our study we do not touch 
upon the second point. 
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Ukrainian exports? Answering these questions would help us to determine how 
sensitive Ukrainian exports are to trade barriers - primarily the import tariffs of its 
partners - and to see whether Ukraine has any scope to increase its exports further. 
With these results in hands, it will be possible to make some judgements about 
whether the MFN mechanism would be helpful. We employ modified gravity 
model of foreign trade in an attempt to answer these questions. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the results of other 
investigations into the effect of the WTO on trade intensity.  Chapter 3 reviews the 
methodology of the empirical gravity model and presents the results of our model. 
Chapter 4 summarizes our findings. The appendix provides detailed tables with 
model results. 
2. Does membership in the WTO 
automatically increase trade? 
One of the prime objectives of the WTO is to smooth trade flows and improve 
market access by lowering tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, and by helping 
with dispute settlements. It is true that since the establishment of the GATT/WTO, 
international trade has significantly increased. As the WTO report stated (The 
WTO, 1988), “The achievements of the system are well worth celebrating … 
during 50 years of GATT/WTO operations, world trade has increased 16 fold … 
merchandise exports grew on average by 6% annually. ... GATT and WTO have 
helped to create a strong and prosperous trading system contributing to 
unprecedented growth.” 
Not everyone share this optimism, though. Indeed, some recent studies 
demonstrate that there is no convincing evidence of a strong relationship between 
membership in the WTO and an increase of exports. Rose (2002, a) provides an 
econometric study of the effect of the GATT/WTO on trade. For this purpose he 
uses a gravity model of international trade for 178 trading entities for the period 
between 1948 and 1999. Rose concludes that “… membership in the GATT/WTO 
is not associated with enhanced trade, once standard factors have been taken into 
account. To be more precise, countries, acceding to the GATT/WTO, do not have 
significantly different trade patterns than non-members. … we currently do not 
have strong empirical evidence that the GATT/WTO has systematically played a 
strong role in encouraging trade.” Moreover, Rose (2002, b) shows that there is 
little evidence that membership in the GATT/WTO has actually liberalised trade 
policies. 
However, others hold to a more balanced point of view. Langhammer and Lucke 
(2000) studied accession issues for vulnerable economies. They conclude that the 
benefits springing from WTO membership in terms of improved market access for 
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traditional exports are likely to be limited, given such characteristics as reliance on 
a small number of export goods (mostly raw materials), weak administrative 
capacities, large economic vulnerability, lack of market-oriented capacities, and 
political instability. They point out that supply bottlenecks in accessing countries 
seem to hamper export expansion more than the policy-induced barriers on the 
demand side. Instead, Langhammer and Lucke argue that the main gains would 
come from market-oriented policies and sending positive signals to foreign 
investors. Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2002) in their work on the WTO and 
Russia argue that the main trade partners of Russia already employ quite low 
import tariffs, and thus the MFN mechanism will not bring significant additional 
benefits. According to their estimates, 70% of the gains in the long term should 
come from increased foreign investments. Other important factors are improved 
resource allocation and better dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Summing up, we would like to stress that joining the WTO is not likely to bring 
an automatic increase in external trade as often claimed in Ukraine. The WTO 
provides acceding countries with good opportunities to develop their foreign trade 
and promote economic growth. But, it is the responsibility of the countries to 
themselves to use these opportunities. Whether a new member of the WTO will 
succeed or fail in this process depends on its political will, on its economic 
development strategy and on the initial conditions (or scope for growth) of the 
economy and the external sector specifically. If the initial conditions are not very 
promising, policy-makers can try to overcome this problem. If they fail, they 
should be blamed, not the WTO. 
Before drawing any conclusions about whether WTO membership will lead to 
increased exports, it is important to examine initial conditions in Ukraine. Here, 
we estimated two of them: the cost of trade barriers imposed by foreign partners 
and the potential level of Ukrainian exports. In the next section we describe the 
methodology of the gravity model employed for these purpose and discuss the 
results of our estimates. 
3. The model and empirical results  
In this section we use the gravity model of international trade for Ukraine. 
Originally this model was independently developed by Tinbergen (1962) and 
Poyhonen (1963), since that time it has been actively used to analyse trade 
patterns between countries. The basic idea is that trade between two countries will 
positively depend on the size of their economies, and negatively on transportation 
costs (usually measured as the distance between countries). Also, trade will be 
more intensive between countries with similar levels of income (GDP/capita is 
usually used as the proxy). The country’s land area or its population figure can 
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serve as proxies for its size. Dummy variables, such as a common border or 
membership in trade organizations are used to capture other influences. 
Despite initial doubts by several critics, the gravity model has proved fruitful by 
throwing light on large variety of research questions. Moreover, recent 
international trade theory (for example, Deardorf, 1995) has shown that even the 
simplest gravity model can be derived from major theories of trade, and thus is 
worth using in empirical studies
3
. 
3.1. Cost of trade barriers imposed by foreign partners 
In this part of our study aside from the standard variables of the gravity model we 
add an indicator of trade liberalisation to the estimating equation. This indicator is 
calculated by the Heritage Foundation for virtually all countries and incorporates 
three parts: the degree of tariff protection in the country; non-tariff barriers; and 
corruption in the customs service (O’Driscoll et al. 2002 (a)). The index ranges 
from “1” (for free) to “5” (for repressed). A higher value of the indicator should 
have a negative influence on foreign trade. 
In this case the specification of our gravity model is as follows: 




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where 
ijX - exports of the country i  to its trade partner j  
ijD - distance between countries i  and j  
iGDP - gross value of the GDP of the country i  
jGDP - gross value of GDP of the trade partner j  
jCISDumm_ - dummy for CIS countries 
jIndexTrade  - index of foreign trade policy 
 
We included data on 85 trade partners for the years 2000 and 2001 and used the 
pooled cross-section technique. Table 3 shows the regression results, estimating 
the effect of barriers, imposed by trade partners on the Ukrainian export volume.  
                                           
3 For further discussion of the gravity model and its applications see Anderson (1979), 
Bergstrand (1985), Davis et al. (1997), Harrigan (2001), Martin (1997), Oguelo et al. 
(1994), Schumaher (2001), Xymena et al. (2000).  
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Table 1. Regression results, cost of trade barriers 
Variables UAXln  
Constant 6.332525 
(1.497133) 
Distance -1.106063 
(-8.812356)*** 
Gross value of the origins country GDP  0.797468 
(0.685728) 
Gross value of the trade partner’s GDP 0.680858 
(10.38499)*** 
Dummy for CIS 1.796171 
(4.824957)*** 
Index of foreign trade policy 0.474575 
(1.785510)* 
R-squared 0.51 
Total number of observations 170 
Note: standard errors are in parentheses; * - 10% significance level, ** - 5% significance 
level, *** - 1% significance level 
The regression results show that the variables are generally acceptably significant, 
except for the “constant” and “the gross value of the GDP” variables. The R-
squared is quite moderate. 
According to estimates, increase of Ukraine’s GDP by 10% would lead to roughly 
8% increase of exports, while 10% economic growth in the ROW results in 7% 
increase of Ukrainian exports. In order to interpret estimate for dummy variable, 
we have to transform it, taking antilog and subtracting one. Results show that 
Ukraine would export to CIS countries by 40% more than to other countries.   
Surprisingly, the regression suggests that the “Trade Index” variable has the 
opposite effect on Ukrainian exports from what we would expect: the higher the 
trade partner’s protection barrier, the more intensive were Ukrainian exports to 
that country. According to estimates, one point increase in trade index is 
associated with 47% increase of exports. Such results contradict common sense 
and accepted theories, and contradict the results of similar studies for other 
countries. For instance, Wall (1999) uses the gravity model to estimate the cost of 
protectionism on USA trade. Using the same Heritage Foundation indicator of 
trade liberalisation in his gravity equation, he finds that this variable has an 
adverse effect on trade volumes. His model quite specifically shows that trade 
barriers by foreign countries reduce U.S. exports by one-fourth, which is equal to 
almost 2% of U.S. GDP. 
Of course, we should not be mislead by these results: a positive value of the trade 
index does not imply that if Ukraine’s trade partners would raise the trade barriers 
even higher, exports would expand further. Instead, a breakdown of Ukrainian 
trade into regions of export destinations shows that Ukraine has traditionally 
strong trade links with countries that have high trade barriers. Such links are quite 
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persistent and import tariffs or NTBs, captured by the index of trade barriers has 
not crucially determined Ukrainian export volumes, at least in the short run. 
The primary trade region of Ukraine covers the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. First of all, Russia alone accounts for more than one-fifth of Ukraine’s 
exports. The CIS as a whole acquires one-third of its exports. Almost all CIS 
countries have high trade index values, meaning “mostly unfree” or “repressed” 
trade regimes. Nevertheless, Ukraine intensively trades with these countries, in 
many cases including special trade arrangements between states, and barter or 
give-and-take schemes. 
Another group of countries, with which Ukraine trades heavily, is the Asian and 
Middle East region. Several of these countries also have repressed trade regimes, 
yet Ukraine manages to supply a significant share of its major export item – 
ferrous metallurgy – to this region. 
Also, Ukraine steadily develops new trade relationships with European Union and 
CEE accessing countries. Currently almost 20% of Ukrainian exports go to the EU 
and around 15% to CEEC countries. We should note here that the EU has quite 
low import tariffs, here Ukraine is hurt more by quotas applied primarily to light 
industry and ferrous metallurgy exports. 
Summarising, our modified gravity equation shows that import barriers of trade 
partners, primarily import tariffs, do not seriously influence the Ukrainian export 
volume. Despite the generally repressive nature of the trade regimes of many of its 
partners, Ukraine trades pretty intensively with the rest of the world, reaching a 
volume of exports over 60% of GDP.  
The next question is to ask how this level of exports corresponds to the potential 
level, predicted by gravity factors. Knowing whether Ukraine under- or over-
trades, compared to the predicted volume of exports, we will proceed to further 
discussion of the issue of improved market access. 
3.2. Potential level of exports 
In order to estimate trade potentials for Ukraine, we first built a gravity model for 
the EU countries and then for Central and Eastern European candidate countries. 
Then, putting actual data for Ukraine into the estimated equations for the EU and 
CEEC countries, we can see where Ukraine over- or under-trades compared with 
these regions and what its potential level of trade is. We decided to compare 
potential trade with that of the EU and accessing CEE countries because of 
Ukraine’s great interest in integration into Europe. 
Thus, we estimated the trade with Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK 
(Luxemburg was excluded due to data problems). The CEEC accession countries 
in our research were represented by Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
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Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (Cyprus and Malta were 
excluded as well). As trade partners we included 85 countries from all world 
regions, using data for the year 2000. 
We used the following specification:  




J
ijjiijij
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_
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where 
ijX - exports of country i  to trade partner j  
ijD - distance between countries i  and j  
iGDP - gross value of the GDP of country i  
jGDP - gross value of the GDP of trade partner j  
ijGDPpcD - difference in GDP per capita between country i  and trade 
partner j  (absolute value) 
jCISDumm_ - dummy variable. It takes the value “1” if the trade partner 
belongs to the EU or to group candidate CEE countries, otherwise “0” 
Below (Table 2) we present the results of the regressions, estimating the gravity 
model for the EU and CEE countries respectively.   
Table 2. Regression results, potential level of exports 
Variables EUXln  CEECXln  
Constant 1.935932 
(0.591668)*** 
6.374373 
(0.521032)*** 
Distance -0.514744 
(0.060709)*** 
-1.106980 
(0.054971)*** 
Gross value of origin country GDP  0.974926 
(0.034526)*** 
0.780380 
(0.042455)*** 
Gross value of the trade partner’s 
GDP 
0.798021 
(0.023883)*** 
0.593993 
(0.030187)*** 
Difference in GDP per capita  -0.195536 
(0.036290)*** 
0.000968 
(0.032726) 
Dummy for EU and CEEC 0.652739 
(0.113618)*** 
0.520605 
(0.132767)*** 
R-squared 0.74 0.72 
Total number of observations 1175 640 
Note:  standard errors are in parentheses; * - 10% significance level, ** - 5% 
significance level, *** - 1% significance level 
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As we can see, the model explains the trade patterns of the EU and CEE countries 
quite well, as confirmed by the value of R-squared. All coefficients have the 
expected signs and are significant at the 1% level, except for the difference in 
GDP per capita in the regressions for CEE countries. 
In order to estimate the potential level of Ukrainian exports in comparison with 
the EU and CEE regions, we entered real data for Ukraine to see what volume of 
goods Ukraine would export, if its trade were explained by the same factors, as 
apply to the EU and CEE. Estimations of potential Ukrainian exports and their 
comparison with the actual level are given in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3. Ukraine’s actual and potential exports 
Trade 
partners 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
(USD m) 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with the EU 
countries’ gravity potential 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with the CEEC 
countries’ gravity potential 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
(USD m) 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
(USD m) 
Ratio of 
actual 
exports to 
potential 
Total (sum of 
85 trading 
partners) 
13128 5988 2.19 4677 2.81 
Advanced 
countries 
3396 3580 0.95 2636 1.29 
CEE countries 
2957 602 4.92 855 3.46 
CIS countries 
4497 684 6.57 756 5.95 
Asia 
1310 567 2.31 138 9.52 
Middle East 
684 228 3.01 172 3.97 
Africa 
96 110 0.87 62 1.54 
South 
America 
188 216 0.87 58 3.24 
The results show that Ukraine exports 2.19 times more than in the case if its trade 
was explained by the same gravity factors as for the EU countries and 2.81 times 
more than in case if factors of the candidate countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe applied. 
As expected, our estimations suggest that Ukraine significantly over-trades with 
the former USSR countries: by more than 6 times. Although the share of exports 
to the CIS gradually decreased over the past several years, economic relations 
between former Soviet Union countries are still very close and very likely will 
remain so in the future, especially taking into account plans of Ukraine, Russia, 
Belorussia and Kazakhstan to establish a Common Economic Area later in 2003. 
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Turning to the prospect for improved market access after Ukraine has become a 
member of the WTO, we should note that not all CIS countries are members of the 
WTO. Hence, the MFN mechanism will work only in trade with selected CIS 
economies. We also know that the FSU states already took active steps to optimise 
trade flows between them, to diminish barriers and ease cooperation. Therefore, 
WTO accession by Ukraine is not expected to result in a significant increase of 
exports to the CIS. 
The close cooperation between FSU countries runs the danger of locking in trade 
with technologically outdated economies (Michalopoulos, Tarr, 1997). In this 
respect relationships with advanced economies could be much more beneficial. As 
estimations of the model show, Ukraine’s actual exports to the EU and other 
advanced countries correspond almost one-to-one to the level, predicted by the 
gravity equations. 
In case of the European Union, improved market access is expected to concern 
primarily ferrous metallurgy (15% of Ukrainian exports to the EU) and light 
industry (10% of Ukrainian exports to the EU). Currently exports of these goods 
are restricted by quotas imposed by the EU, but with WTO membership Ukraine 
would have the chance to reduce these barriers. 
Exports to the CEE countries are significantly higher than model predictions (by 5 
times in comparison with the EU equation and by 3.5 times in comparison with 
the CEE equation). High exports can be explained by the traditional links, 
inherited from SU times, common borders and cultural similarities, such as 
language, etc. 
Ukrainian exports to Asian countries are also above the levels predicted by gravity 
forces. Here we observe quite large discrepancy between estimations from the EU 
and CEEC’s equations (the ratio of the actual to potential exports is 2.3 in the case 
of the EU equation and 9.5 in the case of CEEC’s). In contrast, the model 
estimations concerning the Middle East are more or less similar: Ukraine over-
trades by more than 3 times. As we reported earlier, the major item of exports to 
these countries is ferrous metallurgy products. 
Finally, exports to Africa and South America are slightly lower than the 
predictions by the EU, but higher than by the CEEC’s gravity equation. 
Further development of Ukrainian exports after accession to the WTO and 
particularly the role of the MFN mechanism will of course depend on import 
tariffs, agreed on during the bilateral negotiations with the WTO members. In our 
view, the major impediments to export promotion in Ukraine are those listed by 
Langhammer et al. (2000) and Jensen et al. (2002). Firstly, they concern the 
reliance on a small number of export goods with a low degree of processing, and 
secondly, they are caused by domestic trade barriers, represented by unfavourable 
administrative and political practices. 
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The Ukrainian economy depends heavily on exports of ferrous metallurgical 
products: it is the world’s 4th largest exporter of steel, 50% of all Ukrainian 
exports revenues come from metallurgy. Although the volume of steel exports is 
high, these products are mainly low quality and semi-finished. Moreover, as was 
calculated by Akimova and Scherbakov (2002), the technical efficiency of 
Ukraine’s ferrous metallurgy production is quite low: currently it is at 60% of its 
potential level
4
. Another important export item - fuel products (10% of exports) - 
also consists of intermediate products with a low degree of processing. Other 
export goods are chemical production (10% of Ukrainian exports) and light 
industry (5% of Ukrainian exports). Unfortunately, the efficiency of these 
products is low as well: 60% for the chemical production and only 27% for light 
industry. These results are also supported by Sachs et al. (2000). According to 
their index of international competitiveness, based on the Global Competitiveness 
Report, Ukraine is only in the 57
th
 place out of the 58 countries on the list. In order 
to enhance competitiveness of Ukraine’s products, decrease of import tariffs by 
foreign partners is far from being enough. Instead, inflow of foreign investment 
and know-how should improve the situation. 
Putting all these results together, we note that firstly, Ukraine’s traditional exports 
are only minimally influenced by the trade barriers of its partners, as captured by 
the Heritage Foundation index of foreign trade policy. Secondly, Ukraine already 
exports twice as much as predicted by gravity forces. Thirdly, Ukraine is over-
saturated with exports of intermediary, semi-finished and low-quality goods, while 
the efficiency of its basic exporting industries is rather low. This gives us grounds 
to suggest that the MFN regime will not be a significant factor to provide better 
market access for Ukraine’s traditional exports. 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to question the importance of the factor of improved 
market access after Ukraine’s WTO accession. We looked at the initial conditions 
of Ukrainian exports from two points of view: an assessment of the potential level 
of trade for Ukraine, and an examination of the extent to which Ukrainian exports 
are hurt by barriers imposed by its trade partners. We employed the gravity model 
of international trade to this end. 
                                           
4
 Technical efficiency is defined as ability to produce maximum possible output given 
inputs or, alternatively, minimum possible use of inputs given output. Akimova and 
Scherbakov (2002) measure relative efficiency of a firm in an industry by comparing 
its output to the output, which can be produced by the most efficient firm, given the 
same bundle of inputs.   
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Our analysis shows that according to our estimates, import tariffs and NTBs, 
imposed by Ukraine’s trade partners do not play an important role in determining 
the volume of Ukrainian exports. Ukraine trades more with countries that in 
general have more restrictive trade policies. Beside that, Ukraine already exports 
at twice its potential level, when compared with EU and CEEC countries. And 
finally, Ukraine’ exports depend on a small number of goods with a low degree of 
processing, and the efficiency of the exporting industries is quite low. All this 
suggests that the Most Favoured Nation mechanism and improved market access 
might not be important aspects of Ukraine’s membership in WTO. 
This hypothesis coincides with the results of other studies on WTO and transition 
economy issues, which also conclude that improved market access plays a much 
less important role than increased FDI, better dispute settlement mechanisms and 
improved resource allocation. We think that it is very important to have realistic 
expectations of the WTO membership consequences. In our minds, Ukrainian 
policy makers should not overemphasize the role of improved market access but 
rather use the opportunity to turn the WTO requirements into market reforms, 
which will send positive signals to foreign investors, will help to advance 
technology and improve productivity. 
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Appendix 
A.1. Data 
The data on exports is for 2000, in million USD. Taken from IMF, Directions of 
Trade Statistics, March 2002. 
The GNI per capita is for 2000, USD/capita. Available from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2002. 
The Gross GNI is for 2000, in billion USD. Available from World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2002. 
The distance between countries used is the “as-the-crow-flies” distance between 
their capitals in km. The distance calculation uses the “geod” program, which is 
part of the `PROJ' system of the U.S. Geological Survey. Available from 
www.indo.com/distance. 
A.2. Regression results 
 
Cost of trade barriers 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X_UA?) 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 2000 2001 
Total panel observations 170 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C  6.332525  4.229767  1.497133  0.1363 
LOG(DIST?) -1.106063  0.125513 -8.812356  0.0000 
LOG(GDP_UA?)  0.797468  1.162951  0.685728  0.4939 
LOG(GDP?)  0.680858  0.065562  10.38499  0.0000 
LOG(INDEX?)  0.474575  0.265793  1.785510  0.0760 
DUM_CIS?  1.796171  0.372267  4.824957  0.0000 
R-squared  0.511337     Mean dependent var  3.750091 
Adjusted R-squared  0.496438     S.D. dependent var  1.993449 
S.E. of regression  1.414593     Sum squared resid  328.1759 
F-statistic  34.32188     Durbin-Watson stat  0.103535 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000    
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Gravity model for the EU  
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X?) 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Included observations: 88 
Total panel observations 1175 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C  1.935932  0.591668  3.271990  0.0011 
LOG(D_GDPPC?) -0.195536  0.036290 -5.388109  0.0000 
LOG(D?) -0.514744  0.060709 -8.478799  0.0000 
DUMM_EU_CEEC  0.652739  0.113618  5.745035  0.0000 
LOG(GDP?)  0.974926  0.034526  28.23714  0.0000 
LOG(GDP_GROSS)  0.798021  0.023883  33.41340  0.0000 
R-squared  0.739155     Mean dependent var  5.204044 
Adjusted R-squared  0.738039     S.D. dependent var  2.374407 
S.E. of regression  1.215272     Sum squared resid  1726.479 
Log likelihood -715.2675     F-statistic  662.5170 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.548102     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
 
 
Gravity model for the CEEC 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(X?) 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Included observations: 84 
Total panel observations 640 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C  6.374373  0.521032  12.23413  0.0000 
LOG(D_GDPPC?)  0.000968  0.032726  0.029585  0.9764 
LOG(D?) -1.106980  0.054971 -20.13757  0.0000 
DUMM  0.520605  0.132767  3.921202  0.0001 
LOG(GDP?)  0.780380  0.042455  18.38138  0.0000 
LOG(GDP_GROSS)  0.593993  0.030187  19.67691  0.0000 
R-squared  0.722489     Mean dependent var  3.164401 
Adjusted R-squared  0.720300     S.D. dependent var  2.076813 
S.E. of regression  1.098357     Sum squared resid  764.8503 
Log likelihood -524.2681     F-statistic  330.1182 
Durbin-Watson stat  1.852042     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
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A.3.  Ukraine’s actual and potential exports to different groups 
of countries 
 
 European and other advanced countries 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with EU countries 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with CEEC 
countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of 
actual exports 
to potential 
Total 3396 3580 0.95 2636 1.29 
United States 727 427 1.70 105.6 6.89 
Canada 59 57 1.03 23.3 2.53 
Australia 12 26 0.46 7.7 1.56 
Japan 68 226 0.30 64.1 1.06 
New Zealand 1 5 0.19 2.0 0.51 
Austria 164 113 1.45 166.4 0.99 
Belgium 107 101 1.06 101.8 1.05 
Denmark 25 83 0.30 115.9 0.22 
Finland 24 76 0.32 117.7 0.20 
France 114 387 0.29 257.4 0.44 
Germany 741 669 1.11 565.6 1.31 
Greece 48 75 0.64 85.5 0.56 
Ireland 27 37 0.73 38.0 0.71 
Italy 644 374 1.72 280.8 2.29 
Netherlands 138 147 0.94 138.1 1.00 
Norway 18 68 0.26 87.3 0.21 
Portugal 20 32 0.62 15.6 1.28 
Spain 163 176 0.92 103.9 1.57 
Sweden 8 64 0.13 41.6 0.19 
Switzerland 150 55 2.75 72.2 2.08 
United 
Kingdom 
138 381 0.36 245.2 0.56 
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 CEEC countries 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with EU countries 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with CEEC 
countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of 
actual exports 
to potential 
Total 2957 602 4.92 855 3.46 
Albania 4 5 0.82 7.3 0.55 
Bulgaria 383 24 16.02 32.6 11.74 
Croatia 15 37 0.41 48.6 0.31 
Czech 
Republic 189 52 3.62 69.2 2.73 
 Estonia 55 9 6.28 18.1 3.04 
Hungary 327 55 5.97 84.3 3.88 
Latvia 167 14 12.18 29.0 5.77 
Lithuania 83 24 3.53 56.2 1.48 
Macedonia 42 8 5.27 13.6 3.08 
Poland 418 171 2.44 231.8 1.80 
Romania 165 65 2.53 88.2 1.87 
Slovakia 231 27 8.43 44.2 5.23 
Slovenia 9 19 0.46 33.8 0.27 
Turkey 869 92 9.46 97.9 8.88 
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 CIS countries 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with EU countries 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with CEEC 
countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of 
actual exports 
to potential 
Total 4497 684 6.57 756 5.95 
Armenia 12 3 3.85 4.0 2.97 
Azerbaijan 41 7 5.79 6.8 6.07 
Belarus 272 31 8.64 83.9 3.24 
Georgia 38 6 6.71 5.8 6.57 
Kazakhstan 77 10 7.85 6.2 12.39 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 6 1 4.79 1.3 4.51 
Moldova 176 463 0.38 481.1 0.37 
Russia 3516 151 23.36 157.9 22.26 
Tajikistan 97 1 89.76 1.3 76.59 
Turkmenistan 148 5 28.05 3.5 42.79 
Uzbekistan 114 6 18.06 4.6 24.94 
 
 
 Asia 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with EU 
countries 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with CEEC countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of 
actual exports 
to potential 
Total 1310 567 2.31 138 9.52 
China 629 237 2.65 35.4 17.78 
Hong Kong 3 19 0.16 9.9 0.30 
India 168 129 1.31 31.4 5.35 
Indonesia 77 34 2.25 6.2 12.34 
Korea 146 48 3.04 17.8 8.20 
Malaysia 16 14 1.16 5.1 3.15 
Pakistan 30 28 1.06 11.7 2.56 
Philippines 78 21 3.65 5.4 14.53 
Singapore 71 11 6.34 6.2 11.43 
Thailand 92 25 3.61 8.5 10.79 
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 Middle East 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with EU countries 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with CEEC 
countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Total 684 228 3.01 172 3.97 
Egypt 221 42 5.23 26.8 8.24 
Iran 91 44 2.09 27.6 3.29 
Iraq 0 45 0.00 29.4 0.00 
Israel 106 26 4.02 31.2 3.40 
Kuwait 0 10 0.00 11.9 0.00 
Libya 2 10 0.20 14.0 0.14 
Saudi Arabia 36 2 16.96 3.1 11.72 
Syria 160 13 12.04 10.7 14.98 
United Arab 
Emirates 68 35 1.92 17.7 3.84 
 
 
Africa 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with EU countries 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with CEEC 
countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Total 96 110 0.87 62 1.54 
Algeria 0 22 0.00 15.0 0.00 
Congo 0 1 0.00 0.8 0.00 
Ghana 0 4 0.00 2.0 0.00 
Kenya 3 5 0.56 2.6 1.15 
Morocco 61 17 3.62 9.6 6.39 
Nigeria 0 13 0.00 5.4 0.00 
Senegal 0 3 0.00 1.6 0.00 
South Africa 6 22 0.27 7.5 0.80 
Sudan 0 6 0.00 3.8 0.00 
Tanzania 0 4 0.00 2.1 0.00 
Tunisia 26 11 2.36 10.9 2.38 
Zambia 0 2 0.00 0.9 0.00 
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South America 
Trade partner 
Ukraine's 
actual 
exports 
Ukraine’s exports in comparison 
with EU countries 
Ukraine’s exports in 
comparison with CEEC 
countries 
  
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Ukraine's 
potential 
exports 
Ratio of actual 
exports to 
potential 
Total 188 216 0.87 58 3.24 
Argentina 8 27 0.30 7.5 1.07 
Brazil 75 65 1.16 14.4 5.19 
Chile 13 10 1.35 3.1 4.19 
Colombia 12 16 0.76 4.6 2.63 
Costa Rica 0 5 0.00 1.6 0.00 
Ecuador 11 5 2.35 1.5 7.20 
Mexico 51 51 1.01 12.7 4.00 
Peru 0 10 0.00 2.9 0.00 
Venezuela 8 16 0.50 5.7 1.40 
Cuba 10 13 0.77 3.9 2.57 
 
